This summary presents a diagnostic typology that turns alliance behavior into actionable categories, enabling the Vijigīṣu to bind reliable allies, split ambiguous ones, and use coercion only when instability is structural. It defines four operational actor-types: stable ally, shifting/shared ally, neutral, and dual-policy ruler. Alliances are treated as incentive-driven instruments shaped by calamity, entanglement, exchange, and weakness. Uncertainty is reduced by converting qualitative conduct into labels that guide policy choice. It prescribes phased escalation: saṃdhi and managed reciprocity first; bheda for unreliable/shared ties; daṇḍa as a last resort. It strengthens the Mitra limb in the saptāṅga system by making alliance selection systematic rather than sentimental.
Sutra 1
संहितप्रयाणे मित्रहिरण्यभूमिलाभानामुत्तरोत्तरो लाभः श्रेयान् ॥ कZ_०७.९.०१ ॥
In a combined march/coalition campaign, among gains of ally, money, and land, each successive one is preferable (i.e., money is better than an ally, and land is better than money).
Sutra 2
मित्रहिरण्ये हि भूमिलाभाद्भवतः मित्रं हिरण्यलाभात् ॥ कZ_०७.९.०२ ॥
For from gaining land arise both an ally and money; and from gaining money arises an ally.
Sutra 3
यो वा लाभः सिद्धः शेषयोरन्यतरं साधयति ॥ कZ_०७.९.०३ ॥
Any gain that is already secured can be used to accomplish one of the remaining objectives.
Sutra 4
त्वं चाहं च मित्रं लभावहे इत्येवं आदिध् समसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.९.०४ ॥
A treaty-opening framed as: 'You and I shall both gain a friend'—this is an equal (balanced) alliance.
Sutra 5
त्वं मित्रमित्येवं आदिर्विषमसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.९.०५ ॥
A treaty-opening framed as: 'You are (my) friend/ally'—this is an unequal alliance.
Sutra 6
तयोर्विशेषलाभादतिसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.९.०६ ॥
When one party obtains a special (additional) gain over the other, it is an over-advantage pact (atisaṃdhi).
Sutra 7
समसंधौ तु यः सम्पन्नं मित्रं मित्रकृच्छ्रे वा मित्रमवाप्नोति सोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.९.०७ ॥
Even within an equal alliance, whoever obtains a prosperous ally—or secures an ally when the ally is in distress—has effectively made an over-advantage pact.
Sutra 8
आपद्द् हि सौहृदस्थैर्यमुत्पादयति ॥ कZ_०७.९.०८ ॥
For crisis produces steadiness (tested firmness) in friendship.
Sutra 9
मित्रकृच्छ्रेऽपि नित्यमवश्यमनित्यं वश्यं वेति नित्यमवश्यं श्रेयः तद्द् हि अनुपकुर्वदपि नापकरोति इत्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.०९ ॥
Even when an ally is in hardship, if the choice is between (i) a permanent but non-controllable ally and (ii) a temporary but controllable ally, the teachers hold that the permanent non-controllable ally is preferable; for even if it does not actively help, it does not harm.
Sutra 11
वश्यमनित्यं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.९.११ ॥
A temporary but controllable ally is preferable.
Sutra 12
यावदुपकरोति तावन्मित्रं भवति उपकारलक्षणं मित्रमिति ॥ कZ_०७.९.१२ ॥
One remains a friend only so long as one provides assistance; friendship is defined by beneficial service.
Sutra 13
वश्ययोरपि महाभोगमनित्यमल्पभोगं वा नित्यमिति । महाभोगमनित्यं श्रेयः महाभोगमनित्यमल्पकालेन महदुपकुर्वन्महान्ति व्ययस्थानानि प्रतिकरोति इत्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.१३ ॥
Even between two controllable allies, if the choice is (i) a temporary ally yielding great benefits or (ii) a permanent ally yielding small benefits, the teachers say the temporary high-benefit ally is preferable; for in a short time it renders great assistance and offsets major expenditures.
Sutra 15
नित्यमल्पभोगं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.९.१५ ॥
A small but continuous contribution is preferable.
Sutra 16
महाभोगमनित्यमुपकारभयादपक्रामति उपकृत्य वा प्रत्यादातुमीहते ॥ कZ_०७.९.१६ ॥
A large but irregular benefaction withdraws out of fear of being bound by obligations; or, after helping, it seeks repayment in return.
Sutra 17
नित्यमल्पभोगं सातत्यादल्पमुपकुर्वन्महता कालेन महदुपकरोति ॥ कZ_०७.९.१७ ॥
Because of continuity, one who provides small help regularly becomes, over time, a great benefactor.
Sutra 18
गुरुसमुत्थं महन्मित्रं लघुसमुत्थमल्पं वेति गुरुसमुत्थं महन्मित्रं प्रतापकरं भवति यदा चोत्तिष्ठते तदा कार्यं साधयति इत्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.१८ ॥
“A great ally raised from a powerful base” or “a small ally raised from a weak base”—the teachers say: the great ally arising from a strong base generates power and prestige; when it rises to action, it accomplishes the task.
Sutra 20
लघुसमुत्थमल्पं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.९.२० ॥
A small ally arising from a weak base is preferable (in this comparison).
Sutra 21
लगुसमुत्थमल्पं मित्रं कार्यकालं नातिपातयति दौर्बल्याच्च यथेष्टभोग्यं भवति नेतरत्प्रकृष्टभौमम् ॥ कZ_०७.९.२१ ॥
A small ally from a weak base does not overrun the time-window of action; and, due to its weakness, it can be used as desired—unlike the other, a superior territorial power.
Sutra 22
विक्षिप्तसैन्यमवश्यसैन्यं वेति विक्षिप्तं सैन्यं शक्यं प्रतिसंहर्तुं वश्यत्वादित्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.२२ ॥
‘A dispersed force’ or ‘an uncontrollable force’—the teachers say: a dispersed force can be reassembled, because it is controllable.
Sutra 24
अवश्यसैन्यं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.९.२४ ॥
An uncontrollable force is preferable (in this comparison).
Sutra 25
अवश्यं हि शक्यं सामादिभिर्वश्यं कर्तुं नेतरत्कार्यव्यासक्तं प्रतिसंहर्तुम् ॥ कZ_०७.९.२५ ॥
For what is ‘uncontrollable’ can be made controllable by conciliation and the other means; but not the other—(a force) engrossed in its own operations cannot be readily withdrawn and reassembled.
Sutra 26
पुरुषभोगं हिरण्यभोगं वा मित्रमिति पुरुषभोगं मित्रं श्रेयः प्रुषभोगं मित्रं प्रतापकरं भवति यदा चोत्तिष्ठते तदा कार्यं साधयति इत्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.२६ ॥
‘An ally providing manpower’ or ‘an ally providing gold’—an ally providing manpower is preferable. The teachers say: a manpower-providing ally generates power and prestige; when it rises to action, it accomplishes the task.
Sutra 28
हिरण्यभोगं मित्रं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.९.२८ ॥
An ally who provides monetary support (cash-revenue) is preferable.
Sutra 29
नित्यो हि हिरण्येन योगः कदाचिद्दण्डेन ॥ कZ_०७.९.२९ ॥
Association secured by money is continual; association secured by force is only occasional.
Sutra 30
दण्डश्च हिरण्येनान्ये च कामाः प्राप्यन्त इति ॥ कZ_०७.९.३० ॥
For coercive power (daṇḍa) and other desired ends are obtained through money.
Sutra 31
हिरण्यभोगं भूमिभोगं वा मित्रमिति हिरण्यभोगं गतिमत्त्वात्सर्वव्ययप्रतीकारकरमित्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.३१ ॥
“Should the ally be one who yields cash-benefit or land-benefit?”—the teachers say: the cash-benefit ally, because it is mobile/quick to deploy and can counter every kind of expenditure.
Sutra 33
मित्रहिरण्ये हि भूमिलाभाद्भवत इत्युक्तं पुरस्ताद् ॥ कZ_०७.९.३३ ॥
For it was stated earlier that territorial gain arises from (the combination of) an ally and the treasury.
Sutra 34
तस्माद्भूमिभोगं मित्रं श्रेय इति ॥ कZ_०७.९.३४ ॥
Therefore, an ally who yields land-benefit is preferable.
Sutra 35
तुल्ये पुरुषभोगे विक्रमः क्लेशसहत्वमनुरागः सर्वबललाभो वा मित्रकुलाद्विशेषः ॥ कZ_०७.९.३५ ॥
When manpower-support is equal, the differentiators are: valor, endurance of hardship, loyalty/attachment, or access to all forces—advantages arising from the ally’s family/house (network).
Sutra 36
तुल्ये हिरण्यभोगे प्रार्थितार्थता प्राभूत्यमल्पप्रयसता सातत्यं च विशेषः ॥ कZ_०७.९.३६ ॥
When cash-support is equal, the differentiators are: granting what is requested, political weight/influence, requiring little effort (low transaction cost), and continuity of support.
Sutra 37
तत्रैतद्भवति ॥ कZ_०७.९.३७ ॥
On this point, the following (summarizing verse) is stated.
Sutra 38
अद्वैध्यं चेति सम्पन्नं मित्रं षड्गुणमुच्यते ॥ कZ_०७.९.३८च्द् ॥
An ally endowed with these six qualities—especially freedom from duplicity (advaidhya)—is called a ‘well-qualified ally’ (sampanna-mitra).
Sutra 39
पूर्वोपचितसम्बन्धं तन्मित्रं नित्यमुच्यते ॥ कZ_०७.९.३९च्द् ॥
An ally whose relationship has been built up over time (accumulated earlier) is called a ‘permanent ally’ (nitya-mitra).
Sutra 40
एकतोभोग्युभयतः सर्वतोभोगि चापरम् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४०च्द् ॥
(It is) either: (i) exploitable/accessible from one side only, (ii) exploitable from both sides, or (iii) exploitable on all sides (i.e., accessible in every direction).
Sutra 41
मित्रं नित्यमवश्यं तद्दुर्गाटव्यपसारि च ॥ कZ_०७.९.४१च्द् ॥
A permanent ally is indispensable; and he also serves to clear/remove threats relating to forts and forest tracts (frontiers).
Sutra 42
संधत्ते चोपकाराय तन्मित्रं वश्यमध्रुवम् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४२च्द् ॥
—and who enters into agreement for the sake of advantage (upakāra), that ally is ‘amenable but unstable’ (vaśya-adhruva).
Sutra 43
मित्रभावि भवत्येतन्मित्रमद्वैध्यमापदि ॥ कZ_०७.९.४३च्द् ॥
In a crisis, the ally of friendly disposition becomes non-ambivalent—it does not waver between sides.
Sutra 44
न कस्यचिदुदासीनं द्वयोरुभयभावि तत् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४४च्द् ॥
No one is truly neutral: with respect to the two sides, it tends to assume a disposition toward both (i.e., hedge/dual-play).
Sutra 45
उपकारेऽनिविष्टं वाशक्तं वानुपकारि तत् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४५च्द् ॥
If it is not committed to rendering assistance, or is incapable, then in practice it is non-assisting.
Sutra 46
अनुगृह्णाति यन्मित्रं शत्रुसाधारणं हि तत् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४६च्द् ॥
That ally which shows favor (also to others) is indeed ‘shared with the enemy’.
Sutra 47
उदासीनं भवत्येतद्व्यसनादवमानितम् ॥ कZ_०७.९.४७च्द् ॥
This becomes neutral/aloof when, due to adversity, it has been humiliated.
Sutra 48
अरेर्नेतुश्च यद्वृद्धिं दौर्बल्यादनुवर्तते ॥ कZ_०७.९.४८अब् ॥
And that which, out of weakness, follows the rise/prosperity of an enemy and its leader.
Sutra 49
यो मित्रं समुपेक्षेत स मृत्युमुपगूहति ॥ कZ_०७.९.४९च्द् ॥
Whoever neglects an ally embraces death.
Sutra 50
क्षिप्रमल्पो लाभश्चिरान्महानिति वा क्षिप्रमल्पो लाभः कार्यदेशकालसंवादकः श्रेयानित्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.९.५० ॥
‘A small gain quickly’ versus ‘a great gain after long delay’: the teachers hold that the small, quick gain is preferable when it fits the task, place, and time.
Sutra 52
चिरादविनिपाती बीजसधर्मा महाम्ल् लाभः श्रेयान्विपर्यये पूर्वः ॥ कZ_०७.९.५२ ॥
A great gain that comes later, is not liable to collapse, and is seed-like (capable of generating further gains) is preferable; in the opposite case, the earlier (quick) gain is preferable.
Sutra 53
स्वार्थसिद्धिपरो यायात्संहितः सामवायिकैः ॥ कZ_०७.९.५३च्द् ॥
—he should proceed, intent on securing his own objective, in coordination with confederates/partners acting jointly.
Reduced diplomatic uncertainty: the state avoids over-investing in unstable allies, prevents surprise defection, and secures predictable external support—thereby stabilizing borders, trade routes, and war-readiness with fewer costly mobilizations.
No direct penal code is stated here; the implied daṇḍa is strategic and administrative: negligent ministers/envoys who misclassify allies invite state loss and are punishable under general norms of amātya-aparādha (official misconduct), while externally the response escalates from withdrawal of favor (anugraha) and bheda to coercive measures if betrayal manifests.