Adhyaya 3

Sutra 1

विजिगीषुः शक्त्यपेक्षः षाड्गुण्यमुपयुञ्जीत ॥ कZ_०७.३.०१ ॥

A would-be conqueror should employ the six measures of foreign policy with due regard to relative power.

Sutra 2

समज्यायोभ्यां संधीयेत हीनेन विगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.३.०२ ॥

One should make peace with an equal or a stronger power; one should make war with a weaker power.

Sutra 3

विगृहीतो हि ज्यायसा हस्तिना पादयुद्धमिवाभ्युपैति ॥ कZ_०७.३.०३ ॥

For one who enters conflict with a stronger power is like one who undertakes a foot-fight against an elephant.

Sutra 4

समेन चामं पात्रमामेनाहतमिवोभयतः क्षयं करोति ॥ कZ_०७.३.०४ ॥

And war with an equal causes depletion on both sides—like an unbaked vessel struck by an unbaked object.

Sutra 5

कुम्भेनेवाश्मा हीनेनैकान्तसिद्धिमवाप्नोति ॥ कZ_०७.३.०५ ॥

Against the weaker, one attains assured success—like a stone (shattering) a pot.

Sutra 6

ज्यायांश्चेन्न संधिमिच्छेद्दण्डोपनतवृत्तमाबलीयसं वा योगमातिष्ठेत् ॥ कZ_०७.३.०६ ॥

If the stronger power does not desire peace, one should adopt a posture of compliance under coercion, or else enter into an alliance with one even stronger (than that adversary).

Sutra 7

समश्चेन्न संधिमिच्छेद् यावन्मात्रमपकुर्यात्तावन्मात्रमस्य प्रत्यपकुर्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.३.०७ ॥

If an equal does not desire peace, one should retaliate only to the extent of the harm done—matching measure for measure.

Sutra 8

तेजो हि संधानकारणम् ॥ कZ_०७.३.०८ ॥

Power (tejas) is the real cause that makes alliances/coalitions possible.

Sutra 9

नातप्तं लोहं लोहेन संधत्त इति ॥ कZ_०७.३.०९ ॥

As unheated iron does not weld with iron, so a state lacking ‘heat’ (effective power/pressure) cannot truly bind others into a firm compact.

Sutra 10

हीनश्चेत्सर्वत्रानुप्रणतस्तिष्ठेत्संधिमुपेयात् ॥ कZ_०७.३.१० ॥

If one is inferior and would have to remain everywhere submissive, one should resort to peace (saṃdhi).

Sutra 11

आरण्योऽग्निरिव हि दुःखामर्षजं तेजो विक्रमयति ॥ कZ_०७.३.११ ॥

For, like a forest fire, power born of hardship and resentment drives bold action and expansion.

Sutra 12

मण्डलस्य चानुग्राह्यो भवति ॥ कZ_०७.३.१२ ॥

And he becomes one to be supported/favored by the circle of states (maṇḍala).

Sutra 13

संहितश्चेत्परप्रकृतयो लुब्धक्षीणापचरिताः प्रत्यादानभयाद्वा नोपगच्छन्ति इति पश्येद्द् हीनोऽपि विगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.३.१३ ॥

If, while at peace, he observes that the rival’s constituents are greedy, depleted, or alienated—and that, from fear of reprisals or confiscation, they will not come over—then even if inferior he should choose hostility/war (vigraha).

Sutra 14

विगृहीतश्चेत्परप्रकृतयो लुब्धक्षीणापचरिता विग्रहोद्विग्ना वा मां नोपगच्छन्ति इति पश्येज्ज्यायानपि संधीयेत विग्रहोद्वेगं वा शमयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.३.१४ ॥

If, while at war, he observes that the rival’s constituents—greedy, depleted, or alienated—still do not come over to him because they are frightened by the conflict, then he should make peace even with a stronger opponent, or else calm the panic caused by the war.

Sutra 15

व्यसनयौगपद्येऽपि गुरुव्यसनोऽस्मि लघुव्यसनः परः सुखेन प्रतिकृत्य व्यसनमात्मनोऽभियुञ्ज्यादिति पश्येज्ज्यायानपि संधीयेत ॥ कZ_०७.३.१५ ॥

Even when calamities occur simultaneously, if he sees: ‘I am in a heavier distress; the other is in a lighter one; he can easily remedy his and then press mine,’ he should make peace even with a stronger opponent.

Sutra 16

संधिविग्रहयोश्चेत्परकर्शनमात्मोपचयं वा नाभिपश्येज्ज्यायानप्यासीत ॥ कZ_०७.३.१६ ॥

If, whether by peace or by war, he foresees neither the wearing down of the enemy nor his own growth, then he should remain quiet—even if he is stronger.

Sutra 17

परव्यसनमप्रतिकार्यं चेत्पश्येद्द् हीनोऽप्यभियायात् ॥ कZ_०७.३.१७ ॥

If he sees that the enemy’s calamity cannot be effectively remedied, then even if inferior he should march to attack.

Sutra 18

अप्रतिकार्यासन्नव्यसनो वा ज्यायानपि संश्रयेत ॥ कZ_०७.३.१८ ॥

When one is unable to retaliate, or is close to calamity, one should seek protection (take refuge) even with a stronger power.

Sutra 19

संधिनैकतो विग्रहेणैकतश्चेत्कार्यसिद्धिं पश्येज्ज्यायानपि द्वैधीभूतस्तिष्ठेत् ॥ कZ_०७.३.१९ ॥

If by making peace with one party and waging war against another one foresees the accomplishment of the objective, then—even against a stronger power—one should remain in a dual posture (dvaidhībhāva).

Sutra 20

एवं समस्य षाड्गुण्योपयोगः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२० ॥

Thus, for one who is in a balanced/contested situation, the application of the six measures (ṣāḍguṇya) is to be employed in this manner.

Sutra 21

तत्र तु प्रतिविशेषः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२१ ॥

But in those (applications), there are specific distinctions case by case.

Sutra 22

संधिनोपनमेत्तूर्णं कोशदण्डात्मभूमिभिः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२२च्द् ॥

should quickly approach with a treaty—offering treasury, force, his own person (hostage-like submission), and territory.

Sutra 23

उपस्थातव्यमित्येष संधिरात्मामिषो मतः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२३च्द् ॥

This is considered a treaty of the type “I must present myself”; its inducement (āmiṣa) is one’s own person.

Sutra 24

पुरुषान्तरसंधिः स्यान्नात्मनेत्यात्मरक्षणः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२४च्द् ॥

It is a “treaty through another person”—not through oneself—intended for the protection of one’s own person (self-preservation).

Sutra 25

अदृष्टपुरुषः संधिर्दण्डमुख्यात्मरक्षणः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२५च्द् ॥

A treaty that does not require a visible personal presence (i.e., is concluded at a distance/through agents) is one aimed at self-preservation, with coercive power as its principal basis.

Sutra 26

साधयेद्गूढमित्येते दण्डोपनतसंधयः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२६च्द् ॥

These are treaties brought about by force; one should accomplish them covertly (with concealment and controlled disclosure).

Sutra 27

परिक्रयो भवेत्संधिः स एव च यथासुखम् ॥ कZ_०७.३.२७च्द् ॥

A treaty may take the form of a ‘purchase’ (parikraya—compensatory settlement); and that same arrangement may be shaped to mutual convenience (as circumstances allow).

Sutra 28

निरुद्धो देशकालाभ्यामत्ययः स्यादुपग्रहः ॥ कZ_०७.३.२८च्द् ॥

When constrained by place and time, the arrangement becomes an “atyaya”; it is then (functionally) an upagraha—i.e., a binding security guarantee under constraint.

Sutra 29

सुवर्णसंधिर्विश्वासादेकीभावगतो भवेत् ॥ कZ_०७.३.२९च्द् ॥

A “gold-treaty” (suvarṇa-sandhi—peace secured by payment) can, through trust, progress into unity/integration (ekībhāva).

Sutra 30

पूर्वयोः प्रणयेत्कुप्यं हस्त्यश्वं वा गरान्वितम् ॥ कZ_०७.३.३०च्द् ॥

In the first two cases, one should offer valuables—or elephants and horses—as inducements, even if accompanied by ‘poison’ (i.e., hidden harm/strings attached).

Sutra 31

तिष्ठेच्चतुर्थ इत्येते कोशोपनतसंधयः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३१च्द् ॥

In the fourth case, one should stand firm (make no further offer). These are treaty-settlements that are ‘brought about by the treasury’ (i.e., financed/secured through fiscal means).

Sutra 32

आदिष्टसंधिस्तत्रेष्टो गूढस्तेनोपघातिनः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३२च्द् ॥

In that situation, an ‘ordered/mandated treaty’ is preferred—while covert agents, by that arrangement, strike at the opponent.

Sutra 33

उच्छिन्नसंधिस्तत्रेष्टः परव्यसनकाङ्क्षिणः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३३च्द् ॥

There, a “broken-off treaty” is preferred for one who seeks the opponent’s distress—i.e., keep peace discontinuous so the rival remains vulnerable.

Sutra 34

फलातिमुक्तो भूमिभ्यः संधिः स परिदूषणः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३४च्द् ॥

A treaty that frees (the other side) from paying produce/revenue from the lands is a corrupting, ruinous settlement.

Sutra 35

आदाय फलमित्येते देशोपनतसंधयः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३५च्द् ॥

‘Having taken the benefit (first)’—such are the treaties that are conditioned by the country/terrain (i.e., made possible by geographic circumstances).

Sutra 36

आबलीयसिकाः कार्यास्त्रिविधा हीनसंधयः ॥ कZ_०७.३.३६च्द् ॥

Agreements imposed on the weaker party—these “inferior treaties” are of three kinds.