Even in success, do not over-tighten confederate allies—manage them with autonomy, consultation, and fair gains so the coalition remains a strength rather than a future threat. Sāmavāyika allies multiply force but also multiply veto-points. Atisandhāna (over-binding) triggers suspicion and counter-combinations. Śāstravit allies detect manipulation early and react strategically. Stability comes from dignified consultation and proportional benefit-sharing. Mismanaged allies shift maṇḍala position: friend → neutral/enemy. Foreign policy here is coalition governance, not mere accumulation of troops.
Sutra 1
त्वं चाहं च शून्यं निवेशयावहे इत्यनवसितसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.११.०१ ॥
‘You and I shall both settle the vacant land’—this is an indeterminate treaty.
Sutra 2
तयोर्यः प्रत्युपस्थितार्थो यथोक्तगुणां भूमिं निवेशयति सोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.११.०२ ॥
Of the two, whoever has resources ready at hand and settles land possessing the stated qualities gains an excessive advantage (overreaches the pact).
Sutra 3
तत्रापि स्थलमौदकं वेति महतः स्थलादल्पमौदकं श्रेयः सातत्यादवस्थितत्वाच्च फलानाम् ॥ कZ_०७.११.०३ ॥
Even there, between dry land and irrigated land: a small irrigated tract is preferable to a large dry tract, because yields are continuous and more secure.
Sutra 4
स्थलयोरपि प्रभूतपूर्वापरसस्यमल्पवर्षपाकमसक्तारम्भं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.११.०४ ॥
Even between dry tracts, preferable is that which yields abundant early and late crops, ripens with little rainfall, and can be begun without heavy dependence (on difficult inputs).
Sutra 5
औदकयोरपि धान्यवापमधान्यवापाच्छ्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.११.०५ ॥
Even among irrigated tracts, land suitable for sowing grain is preferable to land suited to non-grain sowing.
Sutra 6
तयोरल्पबहुत्वे धान्यकान्तादल्पान्महदधान्यकान्तं श्रेयः ॥ कZ_०७.११.०६ ॥
When choosing between the two by the criterion of lesser vs. greater, a larger tract of arable, grain-bearing land is preferable to a smaller one.
Sutra 7
महत्यवकाशे हि स्थाल्याश्चानूप्याश्चौषधयो भवन्ति ॥ कZ_०७.११.०७ ॥
For in a wide expanse, medicinal and useful plants arise both in dry tracts and in marshy tracts.
Sutra 8
दुर्गादीनि च कर्माणि प्रभूत्येन क्रियन्ते ॥ कZ_०७.११.०८ ॥
Fortification and related state works are carried out through abundance (of resources).
Sutra 9
कृत्रिमा हि भूमिगुणाः ॥ कZ_०७.११.०९ ॥
For the qualities of land can be made (enhanced) by human effort and policy.
Sutra 10
खनिधान्यभोगयोः खनिभोगः कोशकरः धान्यभोगः कोशकोष्ठागारकरः ॥ कZ_०७.११.१० ॥
Between mining revenue and grain revenue: mining yields cash to the treasury, while grain yields both treasury revenue and stocked granaries.
Sutra 11
धान्यमूला हि दुर्गादीनां कर्मणामारम्भाः ॥ कZ_०७.११.११ ॥
The initiation of fortification and related works is rooted in grain (i.e., a grain base).
Sutra 12
महाविषयविक्रयो वा खनिभोगः श्रेयान् ॥ कZ_०७.११.१२ ॥
Or else, mining income is preferable when it involves the sale of major territorial products (large-scale outputs).
Sutra 13
द्रव्यहस्तिवनभोगयोर्द्रव्यवनभोगः सर्वकर्मणां योनिः प्रभूतनिधानक्षमश्च विपरीतो हस्तिवनभोगः इत्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.११.१३ ॥
Between revenue from a ‘materials forest’ and revenue from an elephant forest: the materials forest is the source of all state works and can sustain abundant reserves; the elephant forest is the opposite—so say the teachers.
Sutra 15
शक्यं द्रव्यवनमनेकमनेकस्यां भूमौ वापयितुं न हस्तिवनम् ॥ कZ_०७.११.१५ ॥
A materials forest can be planted in many places on many kinds of land; an elephant forest cannot.
Sutra 16
हस्तिप्रधानो हि परानीकवध इति ॥ कZ_०७.११.१६ ॥
For the destruction of an enemy host is chiefly achieved by elephants.
Sutra 17
वारिस्थलपथभोगयोरनित्यो वारिपथभोगः नित्यः स्थलपथभोगः ॥ कZ_०७.११.१७ ॥
Of the revenues derived from water-routes and land-routes, the income from water-routes is uncertain, while the income from land-routes is dependable.
Sutra 18
भिन्नमनुष्या श्रेणीमनुष्या वा भूमिरिति भिन्नमनुष्या श्रेयसी ॥ कZ_०७.११.१८ ॥
A territory may have a mixed population or a guild-/corporation-dominated population; the territory with a mixed population is preferable.
Sutra 19
भिन्नमनुष्या भोग्या भवति अनुपजाप्या चान्येषामनापत्सहा तु ॥ कZ_०७.११.१९ ॥
A territory with a mixed population becomes easier to administer for revenue extraction and is less susceptible to being suborned by others; a guild-population, however, can withstand pressure and crises.
Sutra 20
विपरीता श्रेणीमनुष्या कोपे महादोषा ॥ कZ_०७.११.२० ॥
If guild-populations turn hostile, their anger produces grave danger.
Sutra 21
तस्यां चातुर्वर्ण्यनिवेशे सर्वभोगसहत्वादवरवर्णप्राया श्रेयसी बाहुल्याद्ध्रुवत्वाच्च कृष्याः कर्षकवती कृष्याश्चान्येषां चारम्भाणां प्रयोजकत्वात् गोरक्षकवती पण्यनिचयर्णानुग्रहादाढ्यवणिग्वती ॥ कZ_०७.११.२१ ॥
Within such a settlement of the four social orders, the land is better when it is predominantly of the lower orders, since they can bear all forms of state impositions; and because agriculture is numerous and stable, it should be rich in cultivators. Since agriculture drives other enterprises as well, it should also have cattle-herders. And because accumulation of goods and the extension of credit support the economy, it should have wealthy merchants.
Sutra 22
भूमिगुणानामपाश्रयः श्रेयान् ॥ कZ_०७.११.२२ ॥
It is preferable not to depend solely on the inherent qualities of the land.
Sutra 23
दुर्गापाश्रया पुरुषापाश्रया वा भूमिरिति पुरुषापाश्रया श्रेयसी ॥ कZ_०७.११.२३ ॥
A territory may be secured chiefly by forts or chiefly by men; the territory secured chiefly by men is preferable.
Sutra 24
पुरुषवद्धि राज्यम् ॥ कZ_०७.११.२४ ॥
For the state is, in truth, like a person—i.e., it functions through men.
Sutra 25
अपुरुषा गौर्वन्ध्येव किं दुहीत ॥ कZ_०७.११.२५ ॥
A land without men is like a barren cow—what could it yield?
Sutra 26
महाक्षयव्ययनिवेशां तु भूमिमवाप्तुकामः पूर्वमेव क्रेतारं पणेत दुर्बलमराजबीजिनं निरुत्साहमपक्षमन्यायवृत्तिं व्यसनिनं दैवप्रमाणं यत्किंचनकारिणं वा ॥ कZ_०७.११.२६ ॥
But one who seeks to acquire a territory that demands heavy depletion, expenditure, and investment should first “secure a buyer”—i.e., arrange a purchaser/transfer—if he is weak, lacks royal lineage/legitimacy, is without energy, without factional support, of unjust conduct, addicted to vices, guided by fatalism, or acts without judgment.
Sutra 27
महाक्षयव्ययनिवेशायां हि भूमौ दुर्बलो राजबीजी निविष्टः सगन्धाभिः प्रकृतिभिः सह क्षयव्ययेनावसीदति ॥ कZ_०७.११.२७ ॥
When a weak king is installed in a territory that entails heavy losses and expenditures, he—together with his ‘fragrant’ (i.e., loyal and well-disposed) ministers and subjects—sinks under depletion and waste.
Sutra 28
बलवानराजबीजी क्षयव्ययभयादसगन्धाभिः प्रकृतिभिस्त्यज्यते ॥ कZ_०७.११.२८ ॥
Even a strong king is abandoned by ‘non-fragrant’ (ill-disposed/self-interested) constituents out of fear of depletion and waste.
Sutra 29
निरुत्साहस्तु दण्डवानपि दण्डस्याप्रणेता सदण्डः क्षयव्ययेनावभज्यते ॥ कZ_०७.११.२९ ॥
But an unenergetic ruler—even if he possesses coercive power—if he fails to apply it effectively, is broken down, despite having punishment at hand, by depletion and waste.
Sutra 30
कोशवानप्यपक्षः क्षयव्ययानुग्रहहीनत्वान्न कुतश्चित्प्राप्नोति ॥ कZ_०७.११.३० ॥
Even with a treasury, one who lacks a ‘party/wing’ (support-base) gains nothing from anywhere, because he is without relief against losses and expenditures.
Sutra 31
अन्यायवृत्तिर्निविष्टमप्युत्थापयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.११.३१ ॥
A regime that operates unjustly can unsettle even what is already firmly established.
Sutra 32
स कथमनिविष्टं निवेशयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.११.३२ ॥
How could such a person establish what is not yet established?
Sutra 33
तेन व्यसनी व्याख्यातः ॥ कZ_०७.११.३३ ॥
By this, the vice-ridden (misgoverning) ruler is explained/defined.
Sutra 34
दैवप्रमाणो मानुषहीनो निरारम्भो विपन्नकर्मारम्भो वावसीदति ॥ कZ_०७.११.३४ ॥
One who takes fate as the sole measure, is devoid of human effort, undertakes nothing—or undertakes actions that are already doomed—indeed sinks.
Sutra 35
यत्किंचनकारी न किंचिदासादयति ॥ कZ_०७.११.३५ ॥
One who does a little of everything achieves nothing.
Sutra 36
स चैषां पापिष्ठतमो भवति ॥ कZ_०७.११.३६ ॥
And he becomes the most blameworthy (the worst) among them.
Sutra 37
यत्किंचिदारभमाणो हि विजिगीषोः कदाचिच्छिद्रमासादयेदित्याचार्याः ॥ कZ_०७.११.३७ ॥
The teachers say: whenever the would-be conqueror undertakes any course of action, at some point he may encounter a vulnerability (a ‘gap’/opening).
Sutra 38
यथा छिद्रं तथा विनाशमप्यासादयेदिति कौटिल्यः ॥ कZ_०७.११.३८ ॥
Kauṭilya says: in proportion to the vulnerability, one may even meet with destruction.
Sutra 39
तेषामलाभे यथा पार्ष्णिग्राहोपग्रहे वक्ष्यामस्तथा भूमिमवस्थापयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.११.३९ ॥
If those (protective measures/advantages) are not obtainable, then he should secure his territorial position in the manner that will be stated under dealing with the rear-enemy and the ally of the rear-enemy.
Sutra 40
इत्यभिहितसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.११.४० ॥
Thus ends (the type called) ‘declared/explicit treaty’.
Sutra 41
गुणवतीमादेयां वा भूमिं बलवता क्रयेण याचितः संधिमवस्थाप्य दद्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.११.४१ ॥
When demanded by a stronger power—even for a purchase price—he should conclude the treaty and hand over land that is either valuable or at least recoverable.
Sutra 42
इत्यनिभृतसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.११.४२ ॥
Thus ends (the type called) ‘anibhṛta-saṃdhi’ (a treaty not kept concealed / not withheld).
Sutra 43
समेन वा याचितः कारणमवेक्ष्य दद्यात्प्रत्यादेया मे भूमिर्वश्या वा अनया प्रतिबद्धः परो मे वश्यो भविष्यतिभूमिविक्रयाद्वा मित्रहिरण्यलाभः कार्यसामर्थ्यकरो मे भविष्यति इति ॥ कZ_०७.११.४३ ॥
If requested by an equal, he should grant it after considering the reason: “This land will be reclaimable for me; or, by binding him through it, the other will come under my control; or, by selling the land I will gain an ally and gold, which will increase my capacity to accomplish objectives.”
Sutra 44
तेन हीनः क्रेता व्याख्यातः ॥ कZ_०७.११.४४ ॥
By that (standard), the ‘inferior buyer’ has been explained.
Sutra 45
लभमानोऽतिसंधत्ते शास्त्रवित्सामवायिकान् ॥ कZ_०७.११.४५च्द् ॥
When he is in a position of gain, the knower of the science of polity makes additional compacts and coalitional arrangements.
Durable alliance cohesion: confederates remain willing contributors, reducing the risk of defection, veto, or counter-coalition; this stabilizes external security and sustains the vijigishu’s campaign capacity.
No direct penal code is stated here; the ‘danda’ is strategic and systemic—loss of trust, alliance rupture, and the emergence of hostile combinations. Internally, culpable ministers/envoys may be disciplined under general rules of ministerial accountability for causing diplomatic failure.