A decision manual for switching between treaty and offensive exertion based on comparative advantage: conserve alliances and core strength while pressuring an enemy’s peripheries, and renegotiate through intermediaries when constrained. Treaty and war are tools, not virtues; choose by gain (sama/viṣama lābha). Once objectives are met, exit or loosen agreements—stating a reason to manage reputation and future bargaining. Prefer peripheral coercion: use forest/frontier forces to punish or destabilize an enemy’s vulnerable edge without draining the main army. When movement or campaigning is limited, reconfigure compacts via an intermediary to retain leverage and tempo. Overall aim: protect yogakṣema and expand artha by conserving mitra and bala within the saptāṅga ecology.
Sutra 1
यातव्योऽभियास्यमानः संधिकारणमादातुकामो विहन्तुकामो वा सामवायिकानामन्यतमं लाभद्वैगुण्येन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.८.०१ ॥
When one is to march (or is about to be approached), wishing either to secure the grounds for a settlement or to strike, one should bargain with some member of the allied combination (sāmavāyika) by offering double the gain.
Sutra 2
पणमानः क्षयव्ययप्रवासप्रत्यवायपरोपकारशरीराबाधांश्चास्य वर्णयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०२ ॥
While bargaining, he should set forth (to the other party) his losses, expenditures, absence from home, risks of reversal, services rendered, and bodily hardships.
Sutra 3
प्रतिपन्नमर्थेन योजयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०३ ॥
Once consent is obtained, he should bind it to concrete material terms (resources/consideration).
Sutra 4
वैरं वा परैर्ग्राहयित्वा विसंवादयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०४ ॥
Or, having induced others to take up enmity, he should cause (the target) to fall into discord/breach.
Sutra 5
दुरारब्धकर्माणं भूयः क्षयव्ययाभ्यां योक्तुकामः स्वारब्धां वा यात्रासिद्धिं विघातयितुकामो मूले यात्रायां वा प्रहर्तुकामो यातव्यसंहितः पुनर्याचितुकामः प्रत्युत्पन्नार्थकृच्छ्रस्तस्मिन्नविश्वस्तो वा तदात्वे लाभमल्पमिच्छेत् आयत्यां प्रभूतम् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०५ ॥
If he wishes to entangle a party whose undertaking is hard to begin again in further loss and expenditure; or to obstruct the success of the other’s initiated expedition; or to strike at the root or during the expedition; or, being obliged to march, wishes to ask again; or, being in immediate financial distress and therefore not trusting that party—then he should seek a small gain now and a large gain later.
Sutra 6
मित्रोपकारममित्रोपघातमर्थानुबन्धमवेक्षमाणः पूर्वोपकारकं कारयितुकामो भूयस्तदात्वे महान्तं लाभमुत्सृज्यायत्यामल्पमिच्छेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०६ ॥
Considering benefit to a friend, harm to an enemy, and the downstream consequences for resources, and wishing to elicit prior reciprocation, he should forgo a great immediate gain and choose a smaller gain in the future.
Sutra 7
दूष्यामित्राभ्यां मूलहरेण वा ज्यायसा विगृहीतं त्रातुकामस्तथाविधमुपकारं कारयितुकामः सम्बन्धावेक्षी वा तदात्वे चायत्यां च लाभं न प्रतिगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.८.०७ ॥
If one wishes to rescue someone attacked by a hostile power (or a root-destroyer) or by a stronger party; or wishes to have such a benefaction carried out; or is considering obligations of relationship—one should not accept profit either immediately or later.
Sutra 8
कृतसंधिरतिक्रमितुकामः परस्य प्रकृतिकर्शनं मित्रामित्रसंधिविश्लेषणं वा कर्तुकामः पराभियोगाच्छङ्कमानो लाभमप्राप्तमधिकं वा याचेत ॥ कZ_०७.८.०८ ॥
A ruler who, after concluding a treaty, intends to violate it—either to weaken the opponent’s constituent elements (prakṛtis) or to break up the opponent’s alliances and enmities—should, fearing counter-action, demand a gain not yet obtained, or demand more than what was agreed.
Sutra 9
तमितरस्तदात्वे चायत्यां च क्रममवेक्षेत ॥ कZ_०७.८.०९ ॥
The other party should assess the sequence of steps (the likely plan) both for the present and for the future.
Sutra 10
तेन पूर्वे व्याख्याताः ॥ कZ_०७.८.१० ॥
By that (principle), the earlier cases have been explained.
Sutra 11
अरिविजिगीष्वोस्तु स्वं स्वं मित्रमनुगृह्णतोः शक्यकल्यभव्यारम्भिस्थिरकर्मानुरक्तप्रकृतिभ्यो विशेषः ॥ कZ_०७.८.११ ॥
In the case of the enemy and the would-be conqueror each favoring their own ally, the distinction (among allies) is based on: one who undertakes feasible actions, one who undertakes faultless actions, one who undertakes actions with auspicious prospects, one who is steady in execution, and one whose state-elements are loyal.
Sutra 12
शक्यारम्भी विषह्यं कर्मारभते कल्यारम्भी निर्दोषम् भव्यारम्भी कल्याणोदयम् ॥ कZ_०७.८.१२ ॥
One who undertakes what is feasible begins an undertaking that can be sustained; one who undertakes what is proper begins an undertaking free from defects; one who undertakes what is promising begins an undertaking that yields auspicious results.
Sutra 13
स्थिरकर्मा नासमाप्य कर्मोपरमते ॥ कZ_०७.८.१३ ॥
One who is steady in action does not desist from an undertaking before completing it.
Sutra 14
अनुरक्तप्रकृतिः सुसहायत्वादल्पेनाप्यनुग्रहेण कार्यं साधयति ॥ कZ_०७.८.१४ ॥
A state whose constituent elements are loyal, because it has good support networks, accomplishes its objectives even with minimal patronage.
Sutra 15
त एते कृतार्थाः सुखेन प्रभूतं चोपकुर्वन्ति ॥ कZ_०७.८.१५ ॥
Such allies, having achieved their purpose, reciprocate readily and also render substantial assistance.
Sutra 16
अतः प्रतिलोमा नानुग्राह्याः ॥ कZ_०७.८.१६ ॥
Therefore, those who are counter-aligned should not be favored.
Sutra 17
तयोरेकपुरुषानुग्रहे यो मित्रं मित्रतरं वानुगृह्णाति सोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.८.१७ ॥
Between the two, whoever—through favoring a single person—favors an ally or a ‘more intimate’ ally, enters into over-alliance (over-commitment).
Sutra 18
मित्रादात्मवृद्धिं हि प्राप्नोति क्षयव्ययप्रवासपरोपकारानितरः ॥ कZ_०७.८.१८ ॥
From a friend one indeed obtains one’s own advancement; whereas the other (i.e., a non-friend) brings ruin, expenditure, exile/displacement, and ‘help’ that serves others’ interests.
Sutra 19
कृतार्थश्च शत्रुर्वैगुण्यमेति ॥ कZ_०७.८.१९ ॥
And an enemy, once his objective is achieved, lapses into unreliability/defectiveness.
Sutra 20
मध्यमं त्वनुगृह्णतोर्यो मध्यमं मित्रं मित्रतरं वानुगृह्णाति सोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.८.२० ॥
Between two parties seeking to win over the middle king, whoever grants favors to the middle king’s ally or to a still closer ally commits over-attachment (atisandhi).
Sutra 21
मित्रादात्मवृद्धिं हि प्राप्नोति क्षयव्ययप्रवासपरोपकारानितरः ॥ कZ_०७.८.२१ ॥
From a friend one indeed obtains one’s own advancement; whereas the other (non-friend) brings ruin, expenditure, exile/displacement, and ‘help’ that serves others’ interests.
Sutra 22
मध्यमश्चेदनुगृहीतो विगुणः स्यादमित्रोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.८.२२ ॥
If the middle king is favored, he may become “defective” (unreliable/ill-behaved); and the enemy over-commits (seeks excessive alignment) [in response].
Sutra 23
कृतप्रयासं हि मध्यमामित्रमपसृतमेकार्थोपगतं प्राप्नोति ॥ कZ_०७.८.२३ ॥
For the middle king secures an enemy who has already exerted effort, has withdrawn (from elsewhere), and has converged upon a single objective.
Sutra 24
तेनोदासीनानुग्रहो व्याख्यातः ॥ कZ_०७.८.२४ ॥
By that, the policy of favoring the neutral (udāsīna) is explained.
Sutra 25
मध्यमोदासीनयोर्बलांशदाने यः शूरं कृतास्त्रं दुःखसहमनुरक्तं वा दण्डं ददाति सोऽतिसंधीयते ॥ कZ_०७.८.२५ ॥
In contributing troop-contingents to the middle king or the neutral, whoever gives a force that is heroic, well-armed, hardship-enduring, or personally loyal—he over-commits (atisandhi).
Sutra 26
विपरीतोऽतिसंधत्ते ॥ कZ_०७.८.२६ ॥
The reverse (party) also over-commits.
Sutra 27
यत्र तु दण्डः प्रहितस्तं वा चार्थमन्यांश्च साधयति तत्र मौलभृतश्रेणीमित्राटवीबलानामन्यतममुपलब्धदेशकालं दण्डं दद्यात् अमित्राटवीबलं वा व्यवहितदेशकालम् ॥ कZ_०७.८.२७ ॥
But where a dispatched force can accomplish that objective and also other objectives, there one should supply a force—whether of hereditary troops, hired troops, guild forces, allied forces, or forest-tribe forces—suited to the available place and time; or else employ enemy forest-forces at a place and time kept at a distance (i.e., separated/less immediately enabling).
Sutra 28
यं तु मन्येत कृतार्थो मे दण्डं गृह्णीयादमित्राटव्यभूम्यनृतुषु वा वासयेदफलं वा कुर्यादिति दण्डव्यासङ्गापदेशेन नैनमनुगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.८.२८ ॥
But one whom the ruler considers “already satisfied/fulfilled” and likely to seize the coercive apparatus (daṇḍa), or to be stationed in enemy territory/forest tracts/wilderness at an unseasonable time, or to become unproductive—such a person should not be granted further favor, using the pretext of “entanglement/over-attachment to punitive force (daṇḍa-vyāsaṅga).”
Sutra 29
एवमवश्यं त्वनुग्रहीतव्ये तत्कालसहमस्मै दण्डं दद्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.८.२९ ॥
But when he must be favored (despite the risks), the ruler should grant him coercive authority/force only in a form that is compatible with that particular time and occasion.
Sutra 30
आसमाप्तेश्चैनं वासयेद् योधयेच्च बलव्यसनेभ्यश्च रक्षेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.३० ॥
Until the operation is concluded, he should keep him stationed (under oversight), employ him in fighting as needed, and protect him from calamities/disorders affecting the troops.
Sutra 31
कृतार्थाच्च सापदेशमपस्रावयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.८.३१ ॥
And once his purpose has been served, the ruler should have him withdrawn/removed—again with a plausible pretext.
Sutra 32
दूष्यामित्राटवीदण्डं वास्मै दद्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.८.३२ ॥
Or he should assign him a punitive action/command directed specifically against a troublesome enemy or a forest (frontier) zone.
Sutra 33
यातव्येन वा संधायैनमतिसंदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.८.३३ ॥
Or, having made an agreement with one with whom he must proceed (yātavya), he should then re-settle/renegotiate beyond it (i.e., conclude a further/overriding arrangement).
Sutra 34
समहीनविशिष्टानामित्युक्ताः संधिविक्रमाः ॥ कZ_०७.८.३४च्द् ॥
Thus are peace (saṃdhi) and initiative/attack (vikrama) described with reference to those who are equal, inferior, or superior (in position/power).
Strategic stability with controlled escalation: the king avoids wasteful wars when peace yields equal benefit, yet avoids stagnation by pressing advantage when asymmetry favors expansion—thereby protecting revenue, manpower, and alliance credibility.
Not a fixed legal fine here; the implied danda is political-strategic: ministers/commanders who cause loss through wrong choice of saṃdhi/vikrama invite royal sanction (dismissal, confiscation, or punishment) and, more critically, expose the realm to depletion of kośa and bala and erosion of mitra.