Chapter 7.7 makes foreign policy pass a causal and comparative “two-sided” test so the vijigīṣu acts only on superior state interest, not impulse or single-source counsel. It diagnoses the kāraṇas behind proposals, threats, and temptations before choosing instruments, requiring ubhayato-vitarka—arguing both for and against—to expose bias and hidden incentives. Treaty, breach, march, intrigue, and alignment are filtered through śreyas (outcome dominance). The main operational domain is mitra-management, while also protecting the svāmī and amātya from error and conserving kośa and daṇḍa by preventing mistimed or prestige-driven external actions.
Sutra 1
विजिगीषुर्द्वितीयां प्रकृतिमेवमुपगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.०१ ॥
Thus should the would-be conqueror secure the ‘second constituent’ (dvitīyā prakṛti) as an adjunct.
Sutra 2
सामन्तं सामन्तेन सम्भूय यायात् यदि वा मन्येत पार्ष्णिं मे न ग्रहीष्यति पार्ष्णिग्राहं वारयिष्यति यातव्यं नाभिसरिष्यति बलद्वैगुण्यं मे भविष्यति वीवधासारौ मे प्रवर्तयिष्यति परस्य वारयिष्यति बह्वाबाधे मे पथि कण्टकान्मर्दयिष्यति दुर्गाटव्यपसारेषु दण्डेन चरिष्यति यातव्यमविषह्ये दोषे संधौ वा स्थापयिष्यति लब्धलाभांशो वा शत्रूनन्यान्मे विश्वासयिष्यति इति ॥ कZ_०७.७.०२ ॥
He should march in concert with one frontier king (sāmanta) against another frontier king, if he judges: ‘He will not seize my rear (pārṣṇi); he will restrain the rear-seizer (pārṣṇigrāha); he will not turn against me; my forces will be effectively doubled; he will initiate or suppress raids and harassment; on a route full of impediments he will crush obstacles; in fort and forest-clearance operations he will act with coercive power; in an intolerable fault he will be kept to a treaty; and after gaining a share of profit he will reassure my other enemies and bring them to confidence.’
Sutra 3
द्वैधीभूतो वा कोशेन दण्डं दण्डेन कोशं सामन्तानामन्यतमाल् लिप्सेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.०३ ॥
Or, adopting a dual policy, he should seek to obtain from one of the neighboring kings either armed power (daṇḍa) by means of money (kośa), or money by means of armed power.
Sutra 4
तेषां ज्यायसोऽधिकेनांशेन समात्समेन हीनाद्द् हीनेनेति समसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.७.०४ ॥
Among them, an ‘equal treaty’ (sama-saṃdhi) is: with a superior, by granting a larger share; with an equal, by an equal share; with an inferior, by a smaller share.
Sutra 5
विपर्यये विषमसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.७.०५ ॥
In the reverse arrangement, it is an unequal treaty (viṣama-saṃdhi).
Sutra 6
तयोर्विशेषलाभादतिसंधिः ॥ कZ_०७.७.०६ ॥
When, in either of those (treaty types), a special additional gain is secured, it is an ‘over-treaty’ (ati-saṃdhi).
Sutra 7
व्यसनिनमपायस्थाने सक्तमनर्थिनं वा ज्यायांसं हीनो बलसमेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.०७ ॥
An inferior power may bargain with a superior on terms of equal gain when the superior is in distress, stuck in a vulnerable position, or lacking resources/purpose.
Sutra 8
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.०८ ॥
Having concluded a bargain, if he is capable of harming the other, he should act decisively; otherwise he should make peace/settle by agreement.
Sutra 9
एवं भूतो वा हीनशक्तिप्रतापपूरणार्थं सम्भाव्यार्थाभिसारी मूलपार्ष्णित्राणार्थं वा ज्यायांसं हीनो बलसमाद्विशिष्टेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.०९ ॥
Or, being so situated, a weaker king—seeking to make good his deficiency in power and prestige, aiming at attainable gains, or seeking protection of his base and rear—may bargain with a stronger king for gains superior to what mere force-parity would warrant.
Sutra 10
पणितः कल्याणबुद्धिमनुगृह्णीयात् अन्यथा विक्रमेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.१० ॥
When bargaining, one should favor (accept and cultivate) a well‑intentioned counterpart; otherwise, one should move to decisive action (advance/attack).
Sutra 11
जातव्यसनप्रकृतिरन्ध्रमुपस्थितानर्थं वा ज्यायांसं हीनो दुर्गमित्रप्रतिष्टब्धो वा ह्रस्वमध्वानं यातुकामः शत्रुमयुद्धमेकान्तसिद्धिं वा लाभमादातुकामो बलसमाद्द् हीनेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.११ ॥
If one is prone to misfortune, has an exposed vulnerability, faces imminent calamity, is inferior to a stronger power, is hemmed in by a fort or an enemy’s ally, seeks a short route (quick exit), or wishes to secure gain without battle or with assured success—then, even when one’s forces are comparable, one should bargain for an inferior gain.
Sutra 12
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.१२ ॥
When bargaining, if one is capable of harming (retaliating against) him, one should press forward; otherwise, one should make a settlement.
Sutra 13
अरन्ध्रव्यसनो वा ज्यायान्दुरारब्धकर्माणं भूयः क्षयव्ययाभ्यां योक्तुकामो दूष्यदण्डं प्रवासयितुकामो दूष्यदण्डमावाहयितुकामो वा पीडनीयमुच्छेदनीयं वा हीनेन व्यथयितुकामः संधिप्रधानो वा कल्याणबुद्धिर्हीनं लाभं प्रतिगृह्णीयात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.१३ ॥
A stronger ruler, free from vulnerabilities and calamity, may accept an inferior gain when he aims to bind an opponent who has undertaken a difficult enterprise to further loss and expenditure, or when he intends to exile a corrupt/hostile power-holder (dūṣya-daṇḍa), or to draw that corrupt element into his own jurisdiction, or when he seeks to distress a target fit for pressure or elimination by using a lesser concession; likewise, one who prioritizes treaty-making, if well‑intentioned, may accept a lesser gain.
Sutra 14
कल्याणबुद्धिना सम्भूयार्थं लिप्सेत अन्यथा विक्रमेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.१४ ॥
With a well‑intentioned partner, one should pursue the objective jointly (coalition action); otherwise, one should proceed by forceful initiative.
Sutra 15
एवं समः सममतिसंदध्यादनुगृह्णीयाद्वा ॥ कZ_०७.७.१५ ॥
Thus, when dealing with an equal who has aligned intentions, one should either conclude a settlement or extend support.
Sutra 16
परानीकस्य प्रत्यनीकं मित्राटवीनां वा शत्रोर्विभूमीनां देशिकं मूलपार्ष्णित्राणार्थं वा समो बलसमेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.१६ ॥
An equal should bargain for an equal gain (matching forces for matching gain) in order to field a counter‑army against an enemy army, to secure the support of allied forest‑tribes, to obtain local forces in the enemy’s dispersed territories, or to protect one’s base and rear (root and heel).
Sutra 17
पणितः कल्याणबुद्धिमनुगृह्णीयात् अन्यथा विक्रमेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.१७ ॥
When bargaining, one should favor a well‑intentioned party; otherwise, one should proceed to decisive action.
Sutra 18
जातव्यसनप्रकृतिरन्ध्रमनेकविरुद्धमन्यतो लभमानो वा समो बलसमाद्द् हीनेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.१८ ॥
Even an equal, if prone to adversity, having a vulnerability, entangled in many conflicting pressures, or if the counterpart can obtain advantage elsewhere (has outside options), should bargain for an inferior gain despite parity of forces.
Sutra 19
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.१९ ॥
When bargaining, if one can credibly harm him, one should press forward; otherwise, one should conclude a settlement.
Sutra 20
एवं भूतो वा समः सामन्तायत्तकार्यः कर्तव्यबलो वा बलसमाद्विशिष्टेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२० ॥
If (the neighbour) is of this kind and is equal in strength, and his undertaking depends on the neighbour, or if he must build up requisite force, he should bargain by offering a gain superior to what is obtainable under mere parity of power.
Sutra 21
पणितः कल्याणबुद्धिमनुगृह्णीयात् अन्यथा विक्रमेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२१ ॥
After bargaining, he should favour and support one who shows benevolent intent; otherwise, he should proceed with energetic action (pressure/force).
Sutra 22
जातव्यसनप्रकृतिरन्ध्रमभिहन्तुकामः स्वारब्धमेकान्तसिद्धिं वास्य कर्मोपहन्तुकामो मूले यात्रायां वा प्रहर्तुकामो यातव्याद्भूयो लभमानो वा ज्यायांसं हीनं समं वा भूयो याचेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२२ ॥
If the other ruler is prone to vices and has a vulnerable point, wishing to strike at that weakness; or wishing to obstruct an undertaking already begun by the enemy, or to attack at the base or during a campaign; or if, after being induced to set out, he keeps gaining more—then (he) should again demand from him a greater, lesser, or equal concession (as suited).
Sutra 23
भूयो वा याचितः स्वबलरक्षार्थं दुर्धर्षमन्यदुर्गमासारमटवीं वा परदण्डेन मर्दितुकामः प्रकृष्टेऽध्वनि काले वा परदण्डं क्षयव्ययाभ्यां योक्तुकामः परदण्डेन वा विवृद्धस्तमेवोच्छेत्तुकामः परदण्डमादातुकामो वा भूयो दद्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.२३ ॥
If asked again, he should give more when it serves to safeguard his own forces: to have the enemy’s army grind itself down against a hard-to-assault fort, another stronghold, or a difficult forest; or to tie down the enemy’s army on a long route or at an opportune season through loss and expenditure; or, having grown stronger by means of the enemy’s army, to destroy that very army; or to seize the enemy’s force—(in such cases) he should grant further concessions.
Sutra 24
ज्यायान्वा हीनं यातव्यापदेशेन हस्ते कर्तुकामः परमुच्छिद्य वा तमेवोच्छेत्तुकामः त्यागं वा कृत्वा प्रत्यादातुकामो बलसमाद्विशिष्टेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२४ ॥
If he wishes to bring a stronger or weaker ruler into his hand under the pretext of setting out on campaign; or, after eliminating the principal enemy, wishes to eliminate that very ruler; or, having made a concession, wishes later to take it back—he should bargain by offering a gain superior to what parity of power would suggest.
Sutra 25
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.२५ ॥
After bargaining, if he is capable of harming him, he should act vigorously; otherwise, he should conclude a settlement (treaty).
Sutra 26
यातव्यसंहितो वा तिष्ठेत्दूष्यामित्राटवीदण्डं वास्मै दद्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.२६ ॥
Or he should remain prepared with the campaign arrangement; he may also supply him with a troublesome forest-force to harass the enemy.
Sutra 27
जातव्यसनप्रकृतिरन्ध्रो वा ज्यायान् हीनं बलसमेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२७ ॥
If the other ruler is inclined to vices or has a vulnerability, then whether he is stronger or weaker, one should bargain by offering a gain consistent with parity of strength.
Sutra 28
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.२८ ॥
After bargaining, if he can effectively harm him, he should act vigorously; otherwise, he should conclude a settlement.
Sutra 29
एवं भूतं हीनं ज्यायान्बलसमाद्द् हीनेन लाभेन पणेत ॥ कZ_०७.७.२९ ॥
If the other ruler is of this kind and one is inferior while he is superior, one should bargain by offering a gain less than what parity of strength would warrant.
Sutra 30
पणितस्तस्यापकारसमर्थो विक्रमेत अन्यथा संदध्यात् ॥ कZ_०७.७.३० ॥
Having made an offer, if one is capable of harming him (the counterpart), one should press forward; otherwise, one should conclude a settlement.
Sutra 31
ततो वितर्क्योभयतो यतः श्रेयश् ततो व्रजेत् ॥ कZ_०७.७.३१च्द् ॥
Then, after reasoning from both sides, one should proceed toward that course from which the greater advantage results.
Reduced strategic error: the king avoids costly wars or deceptive alliances by requiring causal intelligence and two-sided comparison, preserving kośa, daṇḍa, and public security while improving the reliability of treaties and campaigns.
No single fixed fine is stated in this verse; the ‘daṇḍa’ is functional and administrative: ministers who bypass deliberation invite dismissal, loss of trust, or punishment under broader rules for negligent counsel, while the king’s immediate penalty is strategic loss (kṣaya of kośa/daṇḍa, defeat, or diplomatic isolation).