Break the confederation by turning its unity into suspicion, its leaders into isolated nodes, and its settlements into barriers against recombination—so the vijigīṣu fights fragments, not a league. United sāmavāyikas are dangerous because combined force (saṃhitabala) multiplies power beyond a single king. Yet their corporate form is also a weakness: many stakeholders, many fears, many prices. Start with warnings and planted suspicion to erode trust and coordination. Target the pradhāna by separating him from allies, counsel, and credible information. Exploit intermediaries—especially double-paid agents—to accelerate factional incentives. Finish with a treaty or engineered quarrel that prevents reunification. Recast ‘mitra’ as a controllable limb: acquire, stabilize, or substitute allies to keep conquest moving.
Sutra 1
मित्रमुखानमित्रान्वर्धयितुमेते हि वृद्धास्त्वामेव परिभविष्यन्ति इति ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०१ ॥
‘Do not strengthen enemies who wear the face of friends; once they grow strong, they will themselves humiliate/overpower you’—so one should warn/admonish thus.
Sutra 2
भेदं वा ब्रूयात् अनपकारो यथाहमेतैः सम्भूयाभियुक्तस्तथा त्वामप्येते संहितबलाः स्वस्था व्यसने वाभियोक्ष्यन्ते बलं हि चित्तं विकरोति तदेषां विघातय इति ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०२ ॥
Or one should advocate “division,” saying: “Though I have done them no harm, they attacked me after combining; likewise they—once their forces are consolidated—will attack you too, whether you are secure or in distress. Power distorts judgment; therefore break/disrupt them.”
Sutra 3
भिन्नेषु प्रधानमुपगृह्य हीनेषु विक्रमयेत् हीनाननुग्राह्य वा प्रधाने यथा वा श्रेयोऽभिमन्येत तथा ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०३ ॥
When they are divided, secure the principal leader; then press the attack against the weaker. Or, by favoring the weaker, bring them over—whichever course is judged better regarding the principal.
Sutra 4
वैरं वा परैर्ग्राहयित्वा विसंवादयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०४ ॥
Or, having induced others to assume hostility, one should set them at odds (create discord).
Sutra 5
फलभूयस्त्वेन वा प्रधानमुपजाप्य संधिं कारयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०५ ॥
Or, by tempting the principal with a larger share of benefits, one should have a treaty/settlement concluded.
Sutra 6
अथोभयवेतनाः फलभूयस्त्वं दर्शयन्तः सामवायिकानतिसंहिताः स्थ इत्युद्द्दूषयेयुः ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०६ ॥
Then, agents paid by both sides, displaying “greater gains,” may slander them by saying: “You are a loose coalition, not firmly bound together.”
Sutra 7
दुष्टेषु संधिं दूषयेत् ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०७ ॥
Among the wicked/unreliable, one should corrupt or spoil the treaty (i.e., prevent or break their settlement).
Sutra 8
अथोभयवेतना भूयो भेदमेषां कुर्युः एवं तद् यदस्माभिर्दर्शितमिति ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०८ ॥
Then those paid by both sides (double-salaried agents) should further intensify dissension among them; thus is what we have set forth.
Sutra 9
भिन्नेष्वन्यतमोपग्रहेण चेष्टेत ॥ कZ_०७.१४.०९ ॥
When they are split, one should act by securing (winning over) one of the factions/parties.
Sutra 10
प्रधानाभावे सामवायिकानामुत्साहयितारं स्थिरकर्माणमनुरक्तप्रकृक्तिं लोभाद्भयाद्वा संघातमुपागतं विजिगीषोर्भीतं राज्यप्रतिसम्बद्धं मित्रं चलामित्रं वा पूर्वानुत्तराभावे साधयेत् उत्साहयितारमात्मनिसर्गेण स्थिरकर्माणं सान्त्वप्रणिपातेन अनुरक्तप्रकृतिं कन्यादानयापनाभ्याम् लुब्धमंशद्वैगुण्येन भीतमेभ्यः कोशदण्डानुग्रहेण स्वतो भीतं विश्वास्य प्रतिभूप्रदानेन राज्यप्रतिसम्बद्धमेकीभावोपगमनेन मित्रमुभयतः प्रियहिताभ्यामुपकारत्यागेन वा ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१० ॥
In the absence of principal (supporters) among confederates, the conqueror should secure: an inspirer/leader, a steadfast operator, a constituency naturally devoted, a group that has come together out of greed or fear, an ally fearful of the conqueror, an ally bound by state-interests, and even a wavering enemy—when prior and subsequent supports are lacking. The inspirer should be won by personal commitment; the steadfast operator by conciliation and respectful submission; the loyal constituency by marriage alliance and maintenance; the greedy by a larger share; the frightened (by the enemy) by assistance through treasury and force; one fearful on his own account by reassuring trust and giving hostages/guarantees; one bound by state-interests by entering into union; and an ally by mutual acts of benefit and by foregoing claims (concessions).
Sutra 11
यो वा यथायोगं भजेत तं तथा साधयेत्सामदानभेददण्डैर्वा यथापत्सु व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ कZ_०७.१४.११ ॥
Whomever one should engage according to suitability, that person should be managed accordingly—by conciliation, inducement, division, or force—as we shall explain for various emergencies.
Sutra 12
व्यसनोपघातत्वरितो वा कोशदण्डाभ्यां देशे काले कार्ये वावधृतं संधिमुपेयात् ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१२ ॥
If pressed by calamity or sudden attack, one should enter into a treaty whose terms are assessed with reference to treasury and force, and calibrated to place, time, and objective.
Sutra 13
कृतसंधिर्हीनमात्मानं प्रतिकुर्वीत ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१३ ॥
After concluding a treaty, one should remedy one’s weakened position.
Sutra 14
पक्षे हीनो बन्धुमित्रपक्षं कुर्वीत दुर्गमविषह्यं वा ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१४ ॥
If deficient in factional support, one should create a bloc of kinsmen and allies—or make oneself unassailable through fortification.
Sutra 15
दुर्गमित्रप्रतिष्टब्धो हि स्वेषां परेषां च पूज्यो भवति ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१५ ॥
For one supported by a fort and allies becomes worthy of respect among both one’s own people and outsiders.
Sutra 16
मन्त्रशक्तिहीनः प्राज्ञपुरुषोपचयं विद्यावृद्धसम्योगं वा कुर्वीत ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१६ ॥
If lacking the power of counsel, one should build up a body of wise officials, or associate with learned elders.
Sutra 17
तथा हि सद्यः श्रेयः प्राप्नोति ॥ कZ_०७.१४.१७ ॥
Thus, one attains benefit and advantage immediately.
Sutra 18
खनिः संग्रामोपकरणानां योनिः द्रव्यवनं दुर्गकर्मणां यानरथयोश्च हस्तिवनं हस्तिनां गवाश्वखरोष्ट्राणां च व्रजः ॥ कZ_०७.१४.२५ ॥
Mines are the source of implements of war; resource-forests supply materials for fortification works and for vehicles and chariots; elephant-forests are the source of elephants; and herds (vraja) are the source of cattle, horses, donkeys, and camels.
Sutra 19
तेषामलाभे बन्धुमित्रकुलेभ्यः समार्जनम् ॥ कZ_०७.१४.२६ ॥
If these are not obtainable, they should be procured by collection/raising from kinsmen, allies, and friendly lineages.
Sutra 20
उत्साहहीनः श्रेणीप्रवीरपुरुषाणां चोरगणाटविकम्लेच्छजातीनां परापकारिणां गूढपुरुषाणां च यथालाब्भमुपचयं कुर्वीत ॥ कZ_०७.१४.२७ ॥
If lacking drive/initiative (utsāha), he should, as available, build up (augment) his capacity by drawing upon: capable men from guilds, bands of thieves, forest-dwellers, frontier ‘mleccha’ groups, those inclined to harm the enemy, and secret agents.
Sutra 28
परमिश्राप्रतीकारमाबलीयसं वा परेषु प्रयुञ्जीत ॥ कZ_०७.१४.२८ ॥
Against rivals, he should employ either a supreme mixed counter-measure (a composite response) or a weaker, low-cost measure—whichever is strategically appropriate.
Sutra 29
सम्पन्नः प्रतिनिर्गच्छेत्परावग्रहमात्मनः ॥ कZ_०७.१४.२९च्द् ॥
When adequately prepared, he should withdraw/return so as to avoid being seized or constrained by the enemy.
By preventing confederate aggregation and ensuring treaties are made or broken on advantage, the state avoids sudden coalition warfare, reduces frontier volatility, and secures predictable conditions for revenue, defense readiness, and public order—thereby stabilizing prosperity and safety.
This unit does not specify a codified punishment; the implied daṇḍa is political and administrative: negligent ministers/agents risk dismissal, loss of trust, and punitive discipline under emergency doctrine, because failure to disrupt a hostile confederation invites strategic defeat and consequent coercive measures.