Shloka 15
राजधर्मः, दण्डनीतिः, कर्तृत्व-विचारः च
Royal Duty, Lawful Discipline, and the Question of Agency
अथवा तदुपादानात् प्राप्तुयात् कर्मण: फलम् । दण्डशस्त्रकृतं पापं पुरुषे तन्न विद्यते
athavā tadupādānāt prāpnuyāt karmaṇaḥ phalam | daṇḍaśastrakṛtaṃ pāpaṃ puruṣe tan na vidyate ||
Ou bien, si l’on soutient que «le simple fait de saisir cet instrument oblige l’être conscient à recevoir le fruit de l’acte violent (puisque la hache est inerte)», alors ce résultat devrait revenir à celui qui a forgé l’arme et à celui qui en a fixé le manche, car ce sont eux les causes premières. Dans ce cas, celui qui la brandit ne porterait aucune responsabilité. Vyāsa dit cela pour mettre au jour l’incohérence d’une faute imputée sur la seule base du contact avec un instrument, et pour montrer que l’intention et l’agentivité fondent la responsabilité morale.
व्यास उवाच
Educational Q&A
Moral responsibility cannot be assigned merely by physical proximity to an instrument. If one claims the ‘taker-up’ of a weapon alone receives the karmic fruit because he is conscious, the logic collapses—then makers and assemblers would be even more responsible as primary causes. Vyāsa uses this to emphasize that ethical accountability depends on true agency (intention and decisive causation), not on a simplistic link between a person and a tool.
In Śānti Parva’s ethical discussion, Vyāsa presents a reductio argument about violence and karmic fruit: if the weapon is inert and only the conscious person can ‘receive’ sin, then responsibility would shift backward to those who created and prepared the weapon. This highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of causation and culpability in acts of harm.