यदि वा मन्येत प्रत्यादेयं प्रकृतिकोपकं दीर्घकालं महाक्षयव्ययमल्पमनर्थानुबन्धमकल्यमधर्म्यं मध्यमोदासीनविरुद्धं मित्रोपघातकं वा कार्यं परः साधयिष्यति विपरीतमहमित्येतस्मिन्विशेषे परिपणितार्थं संधिमुपेयात् ॥ कZ_०७.६.१० ॥
yadi vā manyeta pratyādeyaṃ prakṛtikopakaṃ dīrghakālaṃ mahākṣayavyayam alpam anarthānubandham akalyam adharmyaṃ madhyamodāsīnaviruddhaṃ mitropaghātakaṃ vā kāryaṃ paraḥ sādhayiṣyati viparītam aham ity etasmin viśeṣe paripaṇitārthaṃ saṃdhim upeyāt
S’il estime que l’adversaire accomplira un objectif (i) susceptible d’être renversé, (ii) de nature à irriter les éléments constitutifs de l’État, (iii) qui s’éternise, (iv) entraînant de grandes pertes et dépenses, (v) procurant peu de gain, (vi) comportant des conséquences nuisibles, (vii) de mauvais augure et contraire au dharma, (viii) hostile aux puissances moyennes et neutres, ou (ix) dommageable aux alliés—alors que lui-même peut réaliser l’inverse—il doit, sur cet avantage, conclure un traité aux clauses soigneusement marchandées et calculées (paripaṇita).
When the opponent’s likely objective is strategically costly/unstable/illegitimate and harms one’s alliances and the wider balance, while one can achieve the opposite outcome—then treaty terms should be calculated and secured.
Because treaty choices are evaluated not only against the direct enemy but also against how they shift the regional balance and third-party reactions.