तैरभ्युच्चितस्तृतीयं चतुर्थं वा दण्डस्यांशं मूले पार्ष्ण्यां प्रत्यन्ताटवीषु च रक्षा विधाय कार्यसाधनसहं कोशदण्डं चादाय क्षीणपुराणभक्तमगृहीतनवभक्तमसंस्कृतदुर्गममित्रं वार्षिकं चास्य सस्यं हैमनं च मुष्टिमुपहन्तुं मार्गशीर्षीं यात्रां यायात् ॥ कZ_०९.१.३४ ॥
tair abhyuccitas tṛtīyaṃ caturthaṃ vā daṇḍasyāṃśaṃ mūle pārṣṇyāṃ pratyantāṭavīṣu ca rakṣā vidhāya kāryasādhanasahaṃ kośadaṇḍaṃ ca ādāya kṣīṇapurāṇabhaktam agṛhītanavabhaktam asaṃskṛtadurgam amitraṃ vārṣikaṃ cāsya sasyaṃ haimanaṃ ca muṣṭim upahantuṃ mārgaśīrṣīṃ yātrāṃ yāyāt
Having made these assessments, he should keep back one-third or one-fourth of the army for the protection of the base, the rear, the frontiers, and the forest-marches; and, taking treasury and force sufficient for accomplishing the objective, he should set out on a Mārgaśīrṣa expedition to strike an enemy whose old provisions are depleted, whose new provisions are not yet secured, whose forts are not yet prepared, and to damage his monsoon and winter crops at the ‘handful’ (early/limited) stage.
To prevent strategic surprise at the base, rear, and borders while the main force is away—war is treated as a whole-of-state security problem, not only a battlefield problem.
It maximizes pressure on the enemy’s administrative supply system, increasing desertion, unrest, and bargaining leverage while minimizing your own operational risk.