Shloka 15
राजधर्मः, दण्डनीतिः, कर्तृत्व-विचारः च
Royal Duty, Lawful Discipline, and the Question of Agency
अथवा तदुपादानात् प्राप्तुयात् कर्मण: फलम् । दण्डशस्त्रकृतं पापं पुरुषे तन्न विद्यते
athavā tadupādānāt prāpnuyāt karmaṇaḥ phalam | daṇḍaśastrakṛtaṃ pāpaṃ puruṣe tan na vidyate ||
又或者，若有人辩称：“仅因执起此器具，有知之人便必须承受暴行之果（因为斧乃无情之物）”，那么其果报反应归于铸造兵器者与装柄者——因为他们才是主要因缘。如此一来，挥斧者反倒全无责任。毗耶娑如此陈说，正为揭示仅凭与器具的物理接触来归咎之不相应，并阐明行为的作因与意向，才决定伦理上的担当。
व्यास उवाच
Educational Q&A
Moral responsibility cannot be assigned merely by physical proximity to an instrument. If one claims the ‘taker-up’ of a weapon alone receives the karmic fruit because he is conscious, the logic collapses—then makers and assemblers would be even more responsible as primary causes. Vyāsa uses this to emphasize that ethical accountability depends on true agency (intention and decisive causation), not on a simplistic link between a person and a tool.
In Śānti Parva’s ethical discussion, Vyāsa presents a reductio argument about violence and karmic fruit: if the weapon is inert and only the conscious person can ‘receive’ sin, then responsibility would shift backward to those who created and prepared the weapon. This highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of causation and culpability in acts of harm.