Śrī–Indra–Bali Saṃvāda: The Departure and Fourfold Placement of Lakṣmī
तथा हि मुसलैह्हन्यु: शरीरं तत् पुनर्भवेत् । पृथग्ज्ञानं यदन्यच्च येनैतन्नोपपद्यते
tathā hi musalaiḥ hanyuḥ śarīraṃ tat punar bhavet | pṛthagjñānaṃ yad anyac ca yenaitan nopapadyate ||
毗湿摩说道:“因为依此推理,若一具身体被棍棒击毙,那同一具身体也应当再度生起。若又坚持说有一种别异的认知——某种‘他物’——使此不致成立,那么我便要问:你们所立的‘相似之识流’,其质料因(upādāna)究竟是什么?若说紧前一刹那之识为其质料因,则不然,因为彼识已灭。若说仅以前刹那之灭为后刹那相似之识的因,那么即便被棍棒毁坏的身体,也会仅凭其毁坏而成为另一身体再起之因——此乃不可接受的过失。”
भीष्म उवाच
Bhishma presses a causal-logic critique: if one claims a continuous ‘similar’ cognition arises without a persisting basis—either from a vanished prior cognition or from its mere destruction—then the theory yields absurd consequences. A coherent account of karmic continuity and rebirth requires an intelligible causal substrate or linkage, not mere momentary cessation.
In Shanti Parva’s philosophical discussion, Bhishma addresses an opponent’s claim that different persons’ cognitions are wholly distinct, so one person cannot experience another’s karmic results. Bhishma challenges the opponent to explain what underlies the supposed homogeneous stream of cognition, using the ‘body smashed by clubs re-arising’ analogy to show the flaw in making mere destruction a cause.