Shloka 15
राजधर्मः, दण्डनीतिः, कर्तृत्व-विचारः च
Royal Duty, Lawful Discipline, and the Question of Agency
अथवा तदुपादानात् प्राप्तुयात् कर्मण: फलम् । दण्डशस्त्रकृतं पापं पुरुषे तन्न विद्यते
athavā tadupādānāt prāpnuyāt karmaṇaḥ phalam | daṇḍaśastrakṛtaṃ pāpaṃ puruṣe tan na vidyate ||
Ou, se alguém argumenta que “apenas por tomar esse instrumento, a pessoa consciente deve receber o fruto do ato violento (pois o machado é insensível)”, então o resultado deveria pertencer ao que forjou a arma e ao que lhe fixou o cabo—porque são eles as causas primárias. Nesse caso, quem o empunha não teria responsabilidade alguma. Vyāsa diz isso para expor a incoerência de atribuir culpa apenas com base no contato físico com um instrumento e para esclarecer que agência e intenção determinam a responsabilidade ética.
व्यास उवाच
Educational Q&A
Moral responsibility cannot be assigned merely by physical proximity to an instrument. If one claims the ‘taker-up’ of a weapon alone receives the karmic fruit because he is conscious, the logic collapses—then makers and assemblers would be even more responsible as primary causes. Vyāsa uses this to emphasize that ethical accountability depends on true agency (intention and decisive causation), not on a simplistic link between a person and a tool.
In Śānti Parva’s ethical discussion, Vyāsa presents a reductio argument about violence and karmic fruit: if the weapon is inert and only the conscious person can ‘receive’ sin, then responsibility would shift backward to those who created and prepared the weapon. This highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of causation and culpability in acts of harm.