Purohita-Niyoga and the Brahma–Kṣatra Concord
Aila–Kaśyapa Saṃvāda
ऐल उवाच यदि दण्ड: स्पृशते5पुण्यपापं पापै: पापे क्रियमाणे विशेषात् । कस्य हेतो: सुकृतं नाम कुर्याद् दुष्कृतं वा कस्य हेतोर्न कुर्यात्
aila uvāca yadi daṇḍaḥ spṛśate ’puṇyapāpaṃ pāpaiḥ pāpe kriyamāṇe viśeṣāt | kasya hetoḥ sukṛtaṃ nāma kuryād duṣkṛtaṃ vā kasya hetoḥ na kuryāt ||
Aila (Purūravas) berkata: “Jika hukuman sampai menyentuh bahkan diri yang melampaui pahala dan dosa—terutama ketika para pendosa melakukan dosa—maka untuk alasan apa seseorang harus melakukan kebajikan? Dan untuk alasan apa ia harus menahan diri dari kejahatan?”
ऐल उवाच
The verse frames a classic ethical problem: if the results of punishment or suffering appear to strike even those who are not responsible (or who are beyond merit and sin), then the rational basis for choosing dharma (good action) over adharma (evil action) seems undermined. The passage functions as a challenge that later reasoning must answer—typically by clarifying how daṇḍa, karma, social order, and unseen causality operate, and why moral restraint remains meaningful.
Purūravas (Aila) voices a pointed doubt in a dialogue on dharma: he observes (or hypothesizes) that punishment can ‘touch’ even the blameless or transcendent, especially amid wrongdoing by sinners, and he asks why anyone should pursue merit or avoid sin under such conditions. This sets up a response about the logic of justice, responsibility, and the moral order.